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Introduction
A group of analysts seek to comprehend the geopolitics of Cape Verde 
at the international context, particularly on the West African region. Duarte 
(2004), Tolentino (2007), Fernandes (2008), Rocha (2008), Gomes (2009) e 
Costa (2011) highlight the importance of Cape Verde as a small island state 
and deepen the relation of this country with other West African states, name-
ly: Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bis-
sau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. 
These authors write on the mechanisms and processes of regional integration 
of Cape Verde in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOW-
AS). The territorial (4033km2) and demographic (500.000 inhabitants) char-
acteristics of the archipelago, its features and its relevance on global  deci-
sion-making process puts Cape Verde into the categories of small states and 
small islands states at the same time (Shlapentokh 2012). Since its independ-
ence in 1975, the country, besides being an  insular and peripheric state, faces 
enormous challenges on the regional and international context. The signing 
of the Constitutive Treaty for the integration of Cape Verde into the ECOWAS 
took place in 1977, only two years after its independence (Reis 2008). The ar-
chipelago finds itself inserted in a region with about 262 million people and 
it has the smallest territorial dimension compared to the continental mass of 
the ECOWAS (Rocha 2008).
Cape Verde’s integration to the ECOWAS has been questioned re-
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garding the benefits and challenges that this process could bring to the archi-
pelago. These debates center essentially on political and economic matters, 
and on the deepening of peace and security in the region. Such discussions 
were brought back in May 2015 due to Cape Verde’s campaign to preside the 
African Development Bank (AFDB) with Cristina Duarte, Minister of Financ-
es. Despite her defeat, she managed to raise significant support by non-con-
tinental voters, when compared to her direct competitors. Nevertheless, it is 
commonly pointed out that one of the fundamental factors for the defeat was 
the weak participation of Cape Verde in the African context. In that sense, we 
depart from the assumption that Cape Verde needs to focus in West Africa´s 
geopolitical scenario, in order to make its socioeconomic interests be fulfilled. 
It is equally important, for both its regional and international projection, that, 
despite its reduced territorial expression, the country manages to affirm itself 
as a role-model for other African states since it values the principles of democ-
racy and good governance.
Geopolitics as a method for the interpretation of the dynamics of po-
litical phenomenon based on its spatial reality (Castro 1961; Gallois 1990) 
allows small insular states, such as Cape Verde, to effectively bet on view of 
development that prioritizes, above all, the security, peace and defense of the 
national territory. Cape Verde, given its geographic reality, needs to promote 
itself in the West African context and, given its geostrategic reality, search for 
a special statute, as it has been doing for the past years. Some investigators 
like Taglioni (2003), Bouchard (2004) and Baldacchino (2007) point out and 
affirm that there are significant economic impacts that result from the insular 
character of small states.
Cape Verde must gather the benefits of this trend and reaffirm a geo-
political prominence in West Africa, reversing the fragilities that come from 
its territorial dimensions smaller than 5.ooo km, and from its demographic 
dimensions that do not exceed 0.5 million. There is a big effort coming from 
policymakers and partners in order to leverage and project the archipelago in 
the international system, looking for means to gain each time more relevance 
and notoriety on a region shaken by phenomenon like terrorism, threats to 
peace, security and stability and the menace posed by the Islamic State. 
In this article, we seek to consider some central questions, such as: 
if Cape Verde should, given its geostrategic position in the Atlantic, and in 
spite of the international financial crisis, bet on the continent and its respec-
tive emerging economies, aiming to boost its socioeconomic development; 
if the archipelago should bet in new sectors, transforming them in service 
and specialized labour platforms, in order to reinforce its regional integration 
process. If so, which aspects should prevail to intensify the small state geopo-
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litical importance for the continent?
To answer such questions, we anchor our work on the qualitative 
method, namely on the interpretative approach and on bibliographical re-
vision. We believe that there is the urgent need to analyze and interpret to 
further explain and understand the geopolitical configuration of Cape Verde 
in the West African context, based on the current international conjuncture 
shaken by the economic and financial crisis. From the originality of the prob-
lematic of Cape Verde’s insertion on the West African context, we consider 
that the present study has a great value to add in this field of study. In a 
context where there is an urgent need to develop deep studies on Cape Verde 
geopolitcs on West Africa, it is indispensable to analyze an array of social, 
geographic, political and economic factors. Given its insularity, Cape Verde 
needs to bet on a geopolitical orientation that confers stability and protection 
in order to face its vulnerabilities. The archipelago’s security must be a nation-
al priority due to the current instability of the sub-region it is located. Cape 
Verde must take advantage of its image of an economic, political and socially 
stable country so that it can effectively materialize the projection it seeks.
Geopolitics and Small States
Geopolitics asserted itself as a scientific field that combines both ge-
ographic factors and political phenomenon. The term ‘Geopolitics’ was first 
used by the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén, that found support on 
the work Politische Geographie (Political Geography) (1897) by Friedrich Ratzel, 
to defend an organic vision of geography, in which the state resembles a bio-
logical organism in constant expansion, that is, states follow “the categorical 
imperative of space expansion, through colonization, amalgamation or con-
quer” (Costa 2008, 57). Even though geopolitics aim to show that processes 
and political guidelines have no meaning out of their respective geographical 
frames, like territory, location, natural resources and populational contingent, 
what is certain is that it ends up characterizing as a method that interprets 
political phenomenon in its spatial reality (Castro 1961). The process of asser-
tion of geopolitics as science do not show itself as an easy task, considering 
that some facts and justifications pointed out were summoned by the nazi 
expansion campaigns between 1933-1945, culminating in real tragedies for 
mankind. In that sense, geopolitics transformed itself in a very criticized sci-
ence, given the works of Karl Haushofer, from the Geopolitics School of Munich 
and the journal Zeitschrift für Geopolitik, created in 1924 (Mello 1999). Today, 
geopolitics is gaining notoriety between specialists of different study areas, 
from politics, investigators, journalists and, above all, international politics 
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analysts, that frequently use the term, mainly because of three factors: firstly, 
because the geopolitical discourse constantly deals with matters of power and 
conflict in the international arena, making it attractive to the public opinion; 
secondly, because of the fact that geopolitics coherently seem to explain the 
most complex international phenomenon, creating schemes of analysis and 
interpretation, that give consistency to explanations on how an event may in-
fluence or be influenced by a much larger process in global scale; third, it 
almost seems to have a prophetical discourse, since it foresees and points 
towards a given direction of global evolution (Ó Tuathail 2006).
Geopolitics characterizes itself for being an autonomous field of study 
that seeks to comprehend the way in which geography interferes in the polit-
ical behavior of states and societies, differing from political geography in the 
extent that it seeks to present a synchronic vision of reality, while geopolitics 
tries to present a diachronic vision, providing simultaneously signification, 
sense and perspective (Nogueira 2011). It is not just about a compression of 
political geography, but a vision of the power disputes in the international 
scenario. It is important here to perceive the concept of power in order to 
comprehend the conception of geopolitics, in the extent that states (possess-
ing vital spaces) seek, through material and political instruments available, to 
impose their hegemony at international level. Geopolitics “covers the conflict, 
transformation, evolution, revolution, attack, defense and dynamic of terres-
trial spaces, and the political forces that fight over those to survive” (Weigert 
1943, 24).
From the infinity of theoretical and conceptual schools of thought, 
above all from the English Geopolitical School, established by Halford Mackind-
er, the German School, by Friedrich Ratzel, the French School of Geopolitics, by 
Vidal de La Blanche, and the North-American Geopolitics School, by Alfred Ma-
han, it becomes necessary to highlight two chains of thought that are funda-
mental to the comprehension of geopolitics as a concept. The first one refers 
to the ‘theory of the organic state’, that emerges from the social darwinism 
and has among its proponents Friedrich Ratzel and Rudolf Kjellen; the second 
one, denominated ‘geostrategy’, is based mostly on geographical and politi-
cal facts, having proponents such as Alfred Mahan and Halford Mackinder 
(Céleriér 1969; Glassner 1993).
The first theoretical chain, the ‘theory of the organic state’ has as its 
main forerunner Friedrich Ratzel, being strongly influenced by the discover-
ies of Charles Darwin and, therefore, by the ‘social darwinism theory’. The 
German Friedrich Ratzel, geography professor at Leipzig and a graduate in 
biology and chemistry, on its work Political Geography (1896) used metaphors 
from the biological study to comprehend the state as a living organism. In that 
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sense, Ratzel looks into the fundaments that govern the relations between 
geographical space (the land) and states, considering that all state and social 
activities should be seen from the perspective of their real fundaments, that 
are found in the land and the soil on which they live (Weigert 1943). Rudolf 
Kjellen, disciple of Ratzel, follows up from the perspective of his master, con-
sidering in its work State as a Manifestation of Life (1916) that “geopolitics is 
the study of state as a geographical organism, that being, the phenomena 
located on a certain point of Earth, or as a country, territory, region and a 
political domain” (Santos 1993, 7). Kjellen highlights the growing need to 
guarantee political spaces that are vital to the survival of each state, causing 
a growing competition between them, and having the bigger and stronger a 
greater probability to survive, since they extend their domains over smaller 
ones. The central idea on Kjellen is that only the most powerful states would 
survive (Glassner 1993). States, to guarantee their own existence, need space 
in a growing extent in order to expand their borders, being sometimes neces-
sary in the process, to resort to war with other states.
The second chain, ‘geostrategy’, privileges the analysis of a system of 
states, seeking to find models of behavior that fit this system with the goal to 
formulate the best strategies for state actions. Alfred Mahan, north-american 
Admiral and one of the most important proponents of this chain, developed 
the Maritime Power Theory, supplying strong recommendations for his coun-
try’s foreign policy. Mahan considered that the United States should draw as 
its strategy of survival, the hegemony and the control over its continent, in 
order to prevent Japan´s expansion in the Far East, and focus, on the middle 
run, on maritime affairs (Glassner 1993). In that sense, Maritime Power The-
ory turned out to be the “bible of the supporters of United States manifest 
destiny and the advocates of North-American power expansion based on naval 
power” (Mello 1999, 15). Halford Mackinder, geographer and another impor-
tant proponent of this chain, developed the theory of land power, warning the 
importance of the “pivot region” between Germany and Russia, referred as 
Heartland, that represented the vital center of Eurasia (the continental mass 
that embraces Europe and Asia). For Mackinder, “whoever rules East Europe, 
rules the Heartland; who rules the Heartland, rules the World Island, and who 
rules the World Island, rules the World” (Glassner 1993, 26), that is, whoever 
dominates the Heartland will consequently control the World, since it is a re-
gion with no accessibility to the sea and is, therefore, protected from eventual 
maritime attacks of naval powers.
Taking into consideration such perspectives, it is possible to highlight 
that geopolitics is intrinsically related to the geographical power configura-
tion between states in the international arena. We believe that, the bigger the 
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geographical domains of a state, equipped with material conditions (such as 
military and economic power), the bigger is its influence in the international 
context. We also believe that states need to afford such material and political 
capacities to create maritime and territorial strategies with the goal of sustain-
ing their power at a local, regional or world level. Here, we can also add the fol-
lowing question: how can these dimensions apply to small states and, namely, 
those that are insular? Small states have been the object of study of different 
areas of knowledge, as they have been evolving on international relations in 
the last decades (Keohane 1969; Alouche 1994; Nye 2004; Neumann e Gstöhl 
2006; Carlsnaes 2007; Gaspar 2007; Nunes 2007). Nevertheless, there is no 
consensus regarding the definition of small states (Henrikson 2001; Maass 
2009). There is substantial disagreement about which criteria, quantitative 
or qualitative, are more adequate and capable of characterizing small states 
(Maass 2009). Can material, military, scientific, spatial, demographic, institu-
tional, political and moral factors be treated the same way? Measuring the last 
three factors constitutes a very complex task. For example, the Soviet Union 
was a great power, but entered a decay period in the 1990’s, while Switzer-
land, a small state, demonstrated to be a strong country on central Europe, by 
its diplomatic and political position (Gaspar 2007). In this framework, “the 
difference between great powers and small states should be, above all, made 
according to the geographical and human resources available” (Gaspar 2007, 
114). The definition of small state varies basing on the criteria the entity uses, 
which can be qualitative (physical and geographic characteristivs) or quan-
titative (territorial, demographic and economic) (Tolentino 2007). However, 
considering the heterogeneity of small states, applying a precise and rigorous 
definition could create numerous exceptions (Hey 2003).
Through a more classic approach, a small state usually holds a narrow 
territory, a relatively small number of inhabitants and few resources (Aron 
1970). The matter of size is taken as a central criteria to define a small state, 
even though it is not a consensus determinant. For example, Foz (2006) con-
siders that criteria such as dimension are not measurable. Indeed, the author 
centered his analysis on the diplomatic aspect. Therefore, we believe that, in 
order to characterize a state looking for its dimension, we must take into con-
sideration both quantitative and qualitative aspects (Gaspar 2007; Tolentino 
2007; Maas 2009). In that sense, we must apply a definition that avoid those 
stiff and excludent specifications, to find a broader one (Vital 1971). The Unit-
ed Nations, for example, utilizes some criteria such as population inferior 
to 2,5 million inhabitants, political sovereignty and area below 5.000 km2 to 
characterize the dimensions of such small states (Tolentino 2007). That way, 
a small state, from the United Nations perspective, is a state with extremely 
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small identities on what refers to area, population, human and economic re-
sources - based on a comparative and not absolute scale (Rapoport, Muteba 
and Theratill 1971).
Small states, and in this case the insular ones, according to the Unit-
ed Nations, present different criteria: population below 1,5 million inhabit-
ants, political sovereignty or autonomy recognized by the UN and area below 
5.000 km2 (Tolentino 2007). Allied to this aspects are other factors: isolation, 
vulnerability to natural disasters, natural resource scarcity, excessive depend-
ency in international trade, lack of economy scale and high infrastructural, 
transport and administration costs (Tolentino 2007). Cape Verde, the focus of 
our study, fits in this category, presenting a lack of natural resources, narrow 
territory and extreme dependency on international affairs and strategic coop-
eration partnerships. Facing such reality, Cape Verde needs to create alterna-
tives to confront its smallness and insularity. These alternatives, necessarily 
demand the reinforcement of regional and sub-regional integration that can 
sustain in the medium and long run stability and economic sustainability. 
But that will only be possible if it is given primary attention to geopolitics, 
at least in the West African context, whereas considering the prospects of an 
international projection.
West Africa: The ECOWAS
According to the Department of Economic and Social Affairs - from 
the Division of Statistics of the United Nations - the West Africa, where the 
countries of the ECOWAS are located, is formed by a group of sixteen coun-
tries, eight francophones (Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Guinea Konakri, 
Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo), one arabic (Mauritania), five anglophones 
(Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone) and two lusophone (Cape 
Verde and Guinea-Bissau) (Boahen 2010; Uzoigwe 2010).
As shown in Figure 1 on the next page, this region of the African 
continent is divided in two subregions: Sahel, that extends from Mauritania 
to Niger, including Cape Verde, Senegal and Gambia; and the Coastal, that 
includes countries from Guinea-Bissau to Nigeria. West Africa, a stage of the 
European colonization, is one of the most important regions of Subsaharan 
Africa, formed by many countries with diverse culture and characteristics. 
Several African empires, with great weight in transaharian trade, emerged 
in this region (Ghana, Mali, Songai) (Adetula 2004). After the Scramble for 
Africa (1884-1885) the west territory served as a key region on the process 
of African decolonization (Diop 1987; Visentini 2007), producing important 
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 As shown in Figure 1, this region of the African continent is divided in two 
subregions: Sahel, that extends from Mauritania to Niger, including Cape Verde, Senegal and 
Gambia; and the Coastal, that includes countries from Guinea-Bissau to Nigeria. West Africa, 
a stage of the European colonization, is one of the most important regions of Subsaharan 
Africa, formed by many countries with diverse culture and characteristics. Several African 
empires, with great weight in transaharian trade, emerged in this region (Ghana, Mali, 
Songai) (Adetula 2004). After the Scramble for Africa (1884-1885) the west territory served 
as a key region on the process of African decolonization (Diop 1987; Visentini 2007), 
producing important leaders and intelectuals that firmly opposed the colonial regime (Suret-
Canale and Boahen 2010). 
 The Scramble for Africa, that happened during the Berlin Conference, organized by 
the former German chancellor Otto Von Bismarck, between November 19th of 1884, and 
February 26th of 1885 and that praised the race towards Africa of the European great powers, 
represented for the continent, and above all for the West Africa, an era of new geographical 
and territorial configurations (Uzoigwe 2010; Visentini 2011). Such process led to territorial 
conflicts and civil wars across the region (Diop 2000; Ki-Zerbo 2010; Visentini 2007) that 
arose from the rivalries of the European great powers (Ribeiro 2007), which were fighting for 
territorial, natural and mostly African labor. Thus, Visentini (2007, 115) considers that: 
 
Rivalries between distinct groups were stimulated by the colonizers as a means of 
domination, leaving behind a tragic heritage, expressed on the ‘minorities’ and 
‘tribalism’ issues, besides the antagonism between those that embraced the European 
culture, and those who didn’t. Many of the future civil wars would result mainly from 
the distortion of traditional African structure by the colonizers. That is, they were 
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organized by the former German chancellor Otto Von Bismarck, between No-
vember 19th of 1884, and February 26th of 1885 and that praised the race 
towards Afric  of the European great p wers, represented for th  c tinent, 
and above all for the West Africa, an era of new geographical and territorial 
configurations (Uzoigwe 2010; Visentini 2011). Such process led to territorial 
conflicts and civil wars across the region (Diop 2000; Ki-Zerbo 2010; Visen-
tini 2007) that arose from the rivalries of the European great powers (Ribeiro 
2007), which were fighting for territorial, natural and mostly African labor. 
Thus, Visentini (2007, 115) consider  t t:
Rivalries between distinct groups were stimulated by the colonizers as a 
means of domination, leaving behind a tragic heritage, expressed on the 
‘minorities’ and ‘tribalism’ issues, besides the antagonism between those 
that embraced the European culture, nd those who didn’t. Many of th  
future civil wars would result mainly from the distortion of traditional Afri-
can structure by the colonizers. That is, they were outcomes not of a ‘tradi-
tional tribalism’, but of its appropriation by European modernity. 
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Nevertheless, given the complexity of such process, countries of the 
African region created many regional organizations and institutions aiming 
to project socioeconomic development, which was not an easy task. For in-
stance, in May 28th of 1975, through the Lagos Treaty, the Economic Com-
munity for West African States (ECOWAS) was established, representing a 
group of regional states, whose central goal is to create a custom union and a 
common market. The Community, in a broader way, seeks the promotion of 
regional trade, cooperation and development amongst countries such as:  Be-
nin, Burkina-Faso, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, 
Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. 
Given the complexity of the African continent, and specially of the 
West African region, the creation of the ECOWAS was determined by two 
fundamental ideas, being them: [i] the creation, through the cooperation 
among small states of the region, of a common front to fight against the op-
pression of international forces; [ii] the establishment of a robust and viable 
economy, with the main goal of eradicating poverty, that emerged from the 
small dimension of national markets, and the failure of development plans 
from the United Nations for Africa during the 1960’s and 1970’s (Fernandes 
2011). The goals of the ECOWAS aim for: the promotion, cooperation and 
integration of all economic aspects, in order to raise the life quality of their 
inhabitants; the maintenance and eventual growth of economic stability; the 
reinforcement of relations between member states; the contribution to the 
general development of the continent; the harmonization and coordination 
of national politics; the creation of a common market, that points do the lib-
eralization of economic trade; the establishment of common trade policy and 
fares; the elimination of obstacles for the free circulation of people, goods, 
services; and the creation of an African Union (UEMOA, 2006; Fernandes 
2007; Gomes 2009). Even though the biggest concern of the ECOWAS re-
fers to the economic arena, other aspects have become part of the community 
priorities, such as politics, peace and security in the region. As examples, we 
have the meetings of Chiefs of State that ended up resulting in the approval 
of the 1978 Non-Agression Protocol and, in 1981 of the Joint Defense and 
Assistance Protocol (De La Veja 2007). The foundation of the ECOWAS was 
pushed by the persistence of Nigeria, which wanted to overcome the conflicts 
of the region, namely the Coup d’Etat in Togo (January of 1963 and January of 
1967), Congo-Brazaville (August of 1963 and September of 1968) Dahomey 
(October of 1963, December of 1965 and December of 1969), Gabon (Febru-
ary of 1964), Central African Republic (January of 1965), Upper Volta, nowa-
days Burkina Faso (January of 1965), Algeria (June of 1965), Congo-Kinshasa 
(November of 1965), Ghana (February of 1966), Nigeria (January of 1966), 
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Burundi (November of 1966), Togo (January of 1967), Sierra Leone (March 
of 1967 and April of 1968), Mali (November of 1968), Sudan (May of 1969), 
Libya (September of 1969), Somalia (October of 1969) and Lesotho (January 
of 1970). These coups d’Etat influenced Nigeria to convince its neighbour 
states and regional partners of the need to create a common regional entity.
Nigeria, with the support of other countries, specially Togo, Ghana 
and Niger, embraced the task of promoting regional integration, and in 1975 
convinced the countries of the region, namely Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory 
Coast, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, Niger, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo to take part on the creation of the ECOWAS, 
signing its Constitutive Treaty. This particularity made Nigeria acquire notori-
ety as a hegemonic power in the region and, strategically, conduct the geopol-
itics of Africa. Besides this country, there are others which have been object of 
scientific investigation in this geographical space, like Cape Verde, given its 
specificty of land and territory, and its presumable importance in the region, 
at a context where peace, security and development have been constant wor-
ries of African countries, considering the negative impacts of globalization 
such as drug trafficking and terrorism.
Cape Verde at the ECOWAS: projection of a small insular State
Cape Verde is a small insular state located in the middle of the At-
lantic Ocean, between Africa, Europe and the Americas. Composed by about 
500.000 resident inhabitants, the archipelago is formed by ten islands and 
several islanders:
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 According to Figure 2, shown above, the ten islands of vulcanic origin are divided in  
two regions: the Leeward, formed by the islands of Maio (269 km²), Santiago (991 km²), 
Fogo (476 km²) and Brava (64 km²); and the islanders of Santa Maria, Grande, Luis Carneiro 
and Cima; and the Windward region, composed by the islands of Snato Antão (779 km²), São 
Vicente (227 km²), Santa Luzia (35 km², inhabited), São Nicolau (343 km²), Sal (216 km²) 
and Boa Vista (620 km²); and the islanders of Boi, Pássaros, Branco e Raso, Rabo de Junco, 
Curral de Dado, Fragata, Chano and Baluarte (Gomes 2008). With a total surface of about 
4033 km², Cape Verde is located at around 500 km off the African West coast, sided by 
Senegal, between the parallels 17º 12’ e 14º 48’ latitude North and the meridians 22º 41’ and 
25º 22’ of longitude West of Greenwich (Teixeira and Barbosa 1958). 
 Its independence was acquired in the 5th of July, 1975, and symbolized a new age of 
internal and external conquests for the archipelago, recognized by international institutions 
and organizations. The recently created state of Cape Verde gains the statute of a full member 
of the international community and acquires several compromises in order to promote its 
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Figure 2- Cape Verde Geographical Position
Source: http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/cape-verde-map2.htm
According to Figure 2, shown above, the ten islands of vulcanic ori-
gin are divided in  two regions: the Leeward, formed by the islands of Maio 
(269 km2), Santiago (991 km2), Fogo (476 km2) and Brava (64 km2); and the 
islanders of Santa Maria, Grande, Luis Carneiro and Cima; and the Windward 
region, composed by the islands of Santo Antão (779 km2), São Vicente (227 
km2), Santa Luzia (35 km2, inhabited), São Nicolau (343 km2), Sal (216 km2) 
and Boa Vista (620 km2); and the islanders of Boi, Pássaros, Branco e Raso, 
Rabo de Junco, Curral de Dado, Fragata, Chano and Baluarte (Gomes 2008). 
With a total surface of about 4033 km2, Cape Verde is located at around 500 
km off the African West coast, sided by Senegal, between the parallels 17º 12’ 
and 14º 48’ latitude North and the meridians 22º 41’ and 25º 22’ of longi-
tude West of Greenwich (Teixeira and Barbosa 1958).
Its independence was acquired in the 5th of July, 1975, and symbol-
ized a new age of internal and external conquests for the archipelago, recog-
nized by international institutions and organizations. The recently created 
state of Cape Verde gains the statute of a full member of the international 
community and acquires several compromises in order to promote its eco-
nomic and social development, as well as to defend its territorial integrity. 
Given the international organizations of which Cape Verde is a member, we 
highlight: the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), the Communi-
ty of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
Group of 77 (G-77) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Cape Verde 
becomes a member of the ECOWAS at March 16, 1977, two years after its in-
dependence. This community is formed by countries with different territorial 
and geographic dimensions that depend on the development of the region as 
an instrument for its international projection. Cape Verde is the only insular 
state among those of the continental mass that is a member of the ECOWAS 
and, for that reason, seeks, backed by Article 68 of the Abuja Treaty, for a 
special statute inside the community. In this context, Cape Verde is trying to 
obtain benefits, since its independence, from the assistance and help that can 
derive from such multilateral spaces.
The particular case of Cape Verde goes on the opposite way of Ton-
ra’s (2003) idea, of an attempt among small states to take profit of their po-
sitions inside international organizations, to make viable the expression of 
a new international identity, marked specially by the idea that superpowers 
would stand in the same level as small states. The archipelago, knowing its 
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geographical dimension and its lack of natural resources, both economic and 
military, survives, not side by side with world powers, but with the perspective 
of having a geopolitical use for the world, that even though prioritizes the 
expansion of its Continental Shelf (to 350 nautical miles), seeks to maintain 
its national unity and have impacts on the promotion of dialogues and peace 
in the international level. 
Given its geostrategic position, Cape Verde is being inserted in the 
debates and concerns regarding international security and in the fight against 
drug trafficking networks and international terrorism, particularly consider-
ing the imminent threat of the Islamic State. Moreover, the archipelago can 
play an important role on the bonding of the ECOWAS with the world, par-
ticularly with the European Union, China, United States and Brazil. In our vi-
sion, Cape Verde holds, in the Special Partnership with the European Union, 
signed in November 2007, the safeguard of its status as the bridge between 
both continents, having, therefore, important advantages. It is also added the 
importance of such geostrategic position to European Union as a whole, in 
the sense that the country should be more integrated regionally in the African 
continent. However, several controversies have emerged from this process. 
Some defend a ‘no integration’ option, given the problems Africa has been 
facing, while others defend there should be more integration. The ECOWAS 
“despite the political will of its member states leaders, has become an organ-
ization with little articulation, and incapable - financially and politically - of 
answering to the demands detailed on its founding program” (Rosa 2007, 
8). Costa (2011) considers that the ECOWAS project of regional integration 
is doomed to fail, for the simple fact that the community lacks institutional-
ization.
The adherence of Cape Verde to institutions “in the nature of ECOW-
AS was made voluntarily, sustained more on a mythical africanist belief than 
as a result of a realist assessment, based on data regarding the viability of 
goals” (Reis 2008, 84). For those that defend the ECOWAS integration, the 
central argument is that Cape Verde would manage to achieve significant 
benefits from it, since, between 2005 and 2007, there were reforms inside 
the community, that gave it more credibility and efficiency (Rocha 2010). Fer-
nandes (2008) believes that, on relation to the free-circulation of people in the 
region, it allows for a more global conscience on the need of workforce and, 
consequently, on the reinforcement of the humanization of political agendas 
and of greater intervention on humanitarian issues and the protection of hu-
man beings. The free circulation “can work as an ideal, for overthrowing the 
prospect of the globalization of a common workforce” (Fernandes 2008, 64). 
Duarte (2004, 119) recognizes that the regional integration process can be 
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profitable for the Cape Verdian economy, alerting that due to the territorial 
dimensions of the archipelago:
The Cape Verdian economy will have to introduce itself in a vast region-
al market, allowing the country to successfully face latent and permanent 
conflicts between the smallness of its regional market and the optimal di-
mensions of production with its economic dimension, to leverage its geo-
strategic position as a twisting board of international trade.
The debate over regional integration gained renewed attention once 
again in May 2015, with the candidacy of the Cape Verdian Minister of Fi-
nances and Planning, Cristina Duarte, for the presidency of the African De-
velopment Bank (AFDB) which, facing the context of West Africa, gathered 
a weak support, gaining only 10,27% of the votes. However, her direct con-
testant Akinwumi Adesina, from Nigeria, Minister of Agriculture and Rural 
Development won the elections with more than 59% of the votes. One of the 
factors that were presented to explain the defeat of the Minister is related to 
variables of geopolitical nature that favored the Nigerian candidate. This ques-
tion provoked a wave of critics in Cape Verde, against the integration of the 
archipelago, believing that the country has not been able to enjoy a satisfacto-
ry relation with the continent, and that it is necessary to adopt a geopolitical 
agenda that take that into account. The geopolitics of Cape Verde should be 
centered specially in its strategic position on the Atlantic, with attention for 
its defense and security, given the threats of drug trafficking and terrorism.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MIREX) of Cape Verde has been 
looking for, alongside its strategic partners, to develop an intense activity 
towards Africa. We noted, for instance, that Cape Verde has few diplomatic 
representations (embassies) in Africa (Senegal, Ethiopia and Angola) in coun-
tries that could be strategic for its development. Moreover, one should ques-
tion the lack of effective diplomatic representations in the African Union and 
the ECOWAS. Brito (2015), director of Cristina Duarte’s campaign, considers 
that there is a lack of political will and a lack of understanding of the African 
continent reality, that is, Cape Verde did not have a policy of integration in 
Africa. The author is not in favor of creating embassies but argues in favor 
of a closer connection between the economic and diplomatic systems of Cape 
Verde, through Chambers of Commerce, or Cape Verde Investments.
We believe, corroborating other reflections on the issue, that the geo-
politics of Cape Verde in West Africa and, in a wider manner, in the continent, 
has been really modest, and we can see a disconnection between governmen-
tal practice and the rhetoric of political leaders. In order to achieve a bigger 
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opening for the African continent, we believe that Cape Verde should invest 
in a geopolitical agenda based on six pillars: [i] its geostrategic position in the 
Atlantic, that has helped on its international projection [ii] its potential as a 
buffer zone to combat terrorism and drug trafficking, attracting international 
resources for the country´s development; [iii] continue to fight for the exten-
sion of its Continental Shelf, making use of the acquired geographical space 
to increase the dynamics of the national economy; [iv] Bet on sectors such as 
technology, communications and electronic governance, transforming itself 
into a platform of services and specialized workforce in the ECOWAS, search-
ing for the deepening of its regional integration; [v] The internationalization 
of enterprises with significant investments, by creating, for instance, joint 
ventures that would be able to compete with other companies that are in-
stalled in the region; and [vi] Make use of its image as a model of good govern-
ance and democracy in Africa in order to mobilize resources for Cape Verde 
development and, at the same time, act as a “consultant” for other countries 
in the region.
Such initiatives should be put in practice in a framework of cooper-
ation amongst Cape Verde and other states, recognizing its limitations as a 
small insular state with few resources, and that prioritizes the mobilization 
of assistance for development purposes, defense of peace and international 
security. To face off against African powers (with more economic and military 
resources), is not a viable solution for Cape Verde geopolitics in the continent. 
However it is necessary to bet on an international and regional projection that 
may bring advantages for the archipelago in its plan for aid and cooperation. 
We believe that Cape Verde’s geopolitics should not focus on the material 
acquisition of geographical space in the framework of ECOWAS, but mostly, 
and above all, we believe that it should search for immaterial achievements 
such as being recognized by a model country that could offer advantages for 
countries in the region.
 
Final Notes and Geostrategic Recommendations
The geopolitics of Cape Verde in the West African region should be 
based on its possibilities, and mainly on its boldness to create and produce dy-
namics of development that enhances its credibility in the region. The whole 
trajectory of the archipelago’s history, since its independence, has been ac-
companied by challenges for development, in a perspective of conciliating its 
geostrategic position in the Atlantic with the image of model for the African 
continent. The deepening of the Cape Verdian geopolitics in the West African 
region necessarily demands a deeper knowledge of the reality of this region, 
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without losing sight of its condition as a small insular state.
Whereas considering the relative hierarchical position of states in the 
world is complex and is hard to identify the resources of states from some 
characteristics, mainly the non measurable ones. However, due to the iden-
tified and analyzed components, we consider Cape Verde as a small insular 
state that need, by considering these characteristics, to create mechanisms to 
join the geographic regions of its insertion in order to fight against phenom-
enon that put into danger the safety of the archipelago. It is not a coincidence 
that Cape Verde is deepening its relations with powers such as the United 
States, the European Union, China and Brazil. Nevertheless, the archipelago’s 
credibility may also reside in a broader regional integration and in the ben-
efits gained from the mechanisms provided by the region of its geographic 
insertion, that could be reached through a geopolitical agenda that stresses 
diplomatic efforts and the image of a united country that is sustained in the 
principles of peace and collective security.
We consider that the geopolitical strategy of Cape Verde does not in-
volve isolationism, but rather the insertion in a region that may help to achieve 
stability and protection against the vulnerabilities of its own territory. The se-
curity context of the archipelago needs to be allied to its historical, geograph-
ical, political and economic references, allowing it to combine both internal 
and external factors. The current system, shaken by changes that derive from 
the globalization allows, somehow, for the widening of the scope of action of 
small states, mainly those whose territory seems vulnerable to phenomenon 
such as terrorism and drug trafficking. This field of action is supported on 
the contribution of small states to peace and is, indeed, “today, like during 
most of its history, their most dominant characteristic and function” (Almeida 
2012, 425). We can surely affirm that this is what is happening in Cape Verde, 
supported by big regional blocs, in order to contribute in the fight against 
these phenomenon and that is somewhat being a means to prevent some 
conflicts in in West Africa. As long as it follows like that, Cape Verde needs to 
take advantage of its image to project itself regionally, based on a geopolitical 
agenda that emphasizes peace and good governance. In fact, the contribution 
of the archipelago should not limit itself to a selfish concentration of efforts 
to defend its national interest, but as an “active participation in the definition 
of global ethics” (Políbio 2012, 425). We shall say, then, that more than global 
ethics, Cape Verde should prioritize regional ethics. This field needs deep and 
scientific thinking. It would be important, here, to encourage other investi-
gators to explore other prospects and potentialities, mainly on what refers to 
Cape Verdian geopolitics, not excluding the works developed so far. However, 
we alert to the weak scientific production in Cape Verde, particularly in the 
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area of African geopolitics. Facing this reality, we sought, in this investigation, 
to ally scientific literature to an array of other researches from foreign investi-
gators that lean over this reality.
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ABSTRACT
The article seeks to understand the geopolitics of Cape Verde in the context of West 
Africa, and its projection  as a small island State. The central argument is that Cape 
Verde needs to make  pragmatic  use of the Western African coast region for its 
regional projection. The article focus on a qualitative methodological analysis, based 
on an interpretative approach and a bibliographical revision in order to address the 
international phenomena that configure the Cape Verdean geopolitics in West Africa.
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